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Abstract14
Scientific theories explain phenomena using simplifying assumptions: for instance, that the15
speed of light does not depend on the direction in which the light is moving, or that the16
height of a pea plant depends on a small number of alleles randomly obtained from its17
parents. The ability to support these simplifying assumptions with statistical evidence is18
crucial to scientific progress, though it might involve “accepting” the null hypothesis. We19
review two historical examples where statistical evidence was used to accept a simplifying20
assumption (rejecting the luminiferous aether and genetic theory) and one where the null21
hypothesis was not accepted in spite of repeated failures (gravitational waves), drawing22
lessons from each. We emphasize the role of the scientific context in the acceptance of the23
null: accepting the null is never a purely statistical affair.24
Keywords: null hypothesis, philosophy of science, statistics25
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Beyond statistics: accepting the null hypothesis in mature sciences26
On a warm summer morning in 1887, Albert Michelson hunched over a heavy stone27
table in a basement of Western Reserve College. He peered through an eyepiece whose other28
end disappeared under a wooden hood covering the table. With his right hand, he slowly29
turned a screw to calibrate one of sixteen mirrors fixed to the stone. Beneath the hood,30
beams of yellow sodium light bounced back and forth between the mirrors along two31
perpendicular paths that both ended at the eyepiece. By adjusting the screw, Michelson32
ensured that the lengths of the two paths were equal.33
The stone slab sat on a piece of wood which itself was floating in a pool of liquid34
mercury. Around noon Michelson gave the table a push, causing it to slowly spin. Every 22.535
degrees of rotation — about as many seconds — he looked through the eyepiece and36
scribbled down a number. That afternoon he took over one-hundred readings, stopping only37
to give the table a small push to keep it spinning. He came back that evening for another38
hundred measurements, repeating the process again over the next two days.39
The numbers Michelson and his colleague Edward Morley scribbled down in 188740
would eventually be among the most celebrated results in science. What they found — or41
rather, what they didn’t find — was a quandary for popular nineteenth century theories of42
light propagation. Michelson and Morley’s (1887) result foreshadowed not one but two43
revolutions in physics — special relativity and quantum theory — and eventually won44
Michelson the Nobel prize in physics.45
It has been noted for decades that psychological science largely rests on the assertion of46
statistical differences using null hypothesis significance tests rather than resting on47
understanding sameness, patterns, or regularity (see e.g. Gigerenzer, Krauss, & Vitouch,48
2004; Meehl, 1978; Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995). We present three historical49
vignettes involving null inferences (or lack thereof) in mature sciences. None of these50
inferences rest on significant differences from null hypothesis significance tests, but they are51
nevertheless examples of scientific progress. The first is Michelson and Morley’s null result;52
HISTORICAL NULLS 4
the second, Mendel’s famous (and controversial) genetic experiments (Fisher, 1936; Mendel,53
1866); and the third, the recent Nobel-prize-winning findings by the Laser Interferometer54
Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) team. Understanding how the scientific context55
supports null inferences is key to understanding why statistical nulls have traditionally been56
ignored in psychology.57
Kuhnian paradigms and Normal Science58
In the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1962) offers a generally descriptive59
account of how all sciences appear to have changed over time. To the extent that these60
changes can be construed in terms of developmental progress, they follow from motivations61
that appear common among scientific enterprises: to generate understanding of a wide range62
of phenomena and to provide increasingly specified guides for further scientific research.63
Kuhn illustrates this general trajectory by identifying two stages of development.64
The first of these stages is termed pre-paradigm and is marked by an absence of any65
unifying perspectives. At this stage, theories proliferate at the pace of observed effects,66
where these theories are little more than descriptions of a given phenomenon (e.g., when X is67
placed over a flame, Y occurs). Because these theories offer little regarding underlying68
mechanisms, they present no clear hypotheses beyond the replication of the original effect.69
They are essentially tautological, reflecting little in the way of general understanding of a70
phenomenon, and unable to produce novel predictions.71
According to Kuhn, all scientific communities eventually acknowledge this limitation72
and gradually make their way to a standard phase of scientific inquiry. In the Normal73
Science phase, an underlying phenomenon is hypothesized to manifest in the various74
previously unrelated empirical phenomena (e.g., space-time or genes). This hypothesized75
unifying phenomenon lies at the core of a new paradigm, a broad nest of theoretical conceits76
that shape predictions for future observations. Increasingly specifying the nature of these77
conceits — theory articulation — guides the identification of novel effects (rather than the78
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generation of novel “theories”) and subsequent research efforts.79
Kuhn’s depiction of Normal Science progress does not rest on a particular epistemic80
school of thought (e.g., Popper, 1959). Rather, paradigms are understood to facilitate81
progress by motivational means, insofar as they represent progress narratives that encourage82
scientists to predict and accumulate paradigm-verifying effects (rather than perseverate on83
potentially falsifying anomalies, Popper, 1959 – see also the positive heuristic, Lakatos,84
1970).85
The motivational and verificationist realities of Normal Science have fundamental86
implications for how the “null hypothesis” is interpreted, and whether or not it is “accepted.”87
In a Normal Science setting, multiple explanatory paradigms offer competing accounts of88
demonstrated effects and differing predictions for what may be observed in the future. When89
hypotheses following from a given paradigm are not supported by the data, the null90
hypotheses can be readily accepted, as the observed “null” effect may offer support for a91
competing paradigm and represent an additional element of accumulated knowledge.92
Alternatively, Normal Science may be dominated by a single, broad explanatory paradigm93
that can account for the bulk of prior findings, and continues to make successful predictions94
for demonstrable effects. In this setting, scientists may be extremely reluctant to accept a95
null hypothesis that would challenge a paradigm that must be correct, insofar as it has been96
otherwise verified in dozens (hundreds) of prior experiments, and because there are no other97
options, meaning that the acceptance of the null could lead to a scientific crisis.98
We discuss three examples of null effects demonstrated within the paradigmatic99
context of Normal Science. The first and the third are from nineteenth and twenty-first100
century physics, respectively; the second, from nineteenth- and twentieth-century biology. In101
each case, we emphasize the relationship of the statistical inference for or against a null102
hypothesis in the context of the relevant paradigm. Following this, we contrast the situation103
in Normal Science with that in present-day psychology.104
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Michelson, Morley, and the luminiferous aether105
For many centuries, there were two competing theories explaining the behavior of light.106
Emission theory, championed by Newton, held that light was made up of particles that107
moved in straight lines called rays. The opposing view, developed by Huygens, held that108
light was a wave. In the eighteenth century, the emission view was dominant. Emission109
theory is perhaps most consistent with our everyday observations of light; light appears to110
move in straight lines, as a particle would.111
In the beginning of the nineteenth century the wave theory of light gained the upper112
hand among physicists due to the discovery of interference phenomena. When two waves of113
different phases meet, they cancel and reinforce one another in complicated patterns. Light114
behaves this way: when light is forced through slits, the light from one slit interferes with115
light from the other, and vice versa. Interference phenomena cannot be easily explained by116
an emission theory.117
Expectations for light waves were built on other waves that people understood: waves118
in water or air. If light was a wave, it must be a wave in some medium. Whatever this119
medium is, it carries starlight above the earth and torchlight below it. It must be able to120
pass through solid matter as light moves through glass, and it must exist in a vaccum.121
Wave-theorists gave this mysterious medium a name: the luminiferous aether.122
Physicists thought that a sea of luminiferous aether existed thoughout space, providing123
a fixed reference against which everything moves. As the earth revolves around the Sun, it is124
passing through the aether. Facts known at the time ruled out the idea that the aether was125
dragged along with the Earth; hence, the Earth must be moving through the aether at some126
speed.127
But at what speed? This was the question Michelson and Morley sought to answer.128
Michelson had invented and refined an ingeneous experimental device now known as a129
Michelson interferometer. The 1887 version is shown in Figure 1, in both perspective view130
(A) and top-down view (B).131
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The basic idea behind the Michelson interferometer is that it light comes from a132
common source (Figure 1B, at a) and is focused by a lens. The light is split (b) and sent133
along two perpendicular paths, where each beam bounces back and forth between sets of134
mirrors. A final mirror along each path (e and ei) sends each beam back the way it came.135
The beams are recombined at b and pass to the eyepiece (f). The lengths of the136
perpendicular paths can be made equal by carefully adjusting a mirror along one of the137
paths (ei).138
When Michelson looked into the eyepiece while he was sending white light into the139
interferometer, he saw a pattern of vertical dark and light bands, called “fringes”, formed by140
the interference between the various components of white light. After calibration, Michelson141
would rotate the stone table on which the interferometer was set. If one imagines the Earth —142
and with it, the interferometer — moving through the aether, this rotation changes how the143
two arms are moving with the aether “wind”. At some point in the rotation, one arm will be144
facing into the wind, and the other arm perpendicular to it; at another point, the opposite.145
The light moves with the aether, but the interferometer itself moves with the Earth. If146
one arm is moving parallel to the aether wind and the other perpendicular to it, the light147
beams in the two arms move different distances. Any difference between the arms will cause148
the interference fringes to shift to one side by an amount that depends on the speed of the149
Earth’s motion through the aether. Based on the 30 km/s speed of the Earth in its orbit,150
Michelson and Morley expected the fringes to shift by a maximum of 0.4 fringe widths. This151
maximum shift would occur when one arm is facing into the aether wind and the other152
perpendicular to it. The minimum shift was 0, when both arms face into the aether wind at153
the same angle (see the top of Figure 2).154
Michelson (or Morley) gave the table a slow but steady spin and measured the shift at155
16 rotation angles, which worked out to once every 23 seconds. They repeated the process156
consecutively six times, at noon and in the evening, on three different days. The fringe shift157
measurements were detrended to remove the effects of ambient temperature changes, and158
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then averaged. Michelson and Morley expected a sine curve with amplitude 0.4 fringe widths;159
Figure 2 shows what they found.160
There does not appear to be any discernable relationship between the angle of the161
table’s rotation and the fringe shift. There was so little effect relative to the expected 0.4162
fringe shifts that they did not show the expected effect in their figure at all; the maximum163
value in their figure is 1/8 of the predicted value, because showing the predicted value in the164
figure would hide all the variability in the data. In spite of the smallness of the effect,165
Michelson and Morley did not directly “accept” the null. Instead, they say that166
“[T]he displacement to be expected was 0.4 fringe. The actual displacement was167
certainly less than the twentieth part of this, and probably less than the fortieth168
part. But since the displacement is proportional to the square of the velocity, the169
relative velocity of the earth and the ether is probably less than one sixth the170
earth’s orbital velocity, and certainly less than one-fourth. . . It appears, from all171
that precedes, reasonably certain that if there be any relative motion between172
the earth and the luminiferous ether, it must be small. . . ” (Michelson & Morley,173
1887, p. 341)174
Indeed, this result would continue to be refined for decades using more precise175
interferometers, and at different times of the year.1 Michelson and Morley’s result is176
remembered as having established that there was no aether. Why is Michelson and Morley’s177
result considered convincingly null, even though Michelson and Morley merely report an178
upper bound on the possible speed of the Earth moving through the aether?179
A highly-sensitive experiment. Michelson and Morley’s 1887 experiment was180
actually the second such experiment that Michelson published. Michelson (1881) presented181
similar results, but using a device 1/10 as sensitive.2 Other researchers noted that even182
1A recent replication by Eisele, Nevsky, and Schiller (2009) used an interferometer 100 million times as
precise as Michelson and Morley’s device. The result was still null.
2Michelson’s 1881 paper is a model of scientific transparency. A sizeable portion of the paper is taken up
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before accounting for a calculation mistake, “[the fringe shift] to be measured. . . was already183
barely beyond the limits of the errors of experiment” and hence “the conclusion184
drawn. . .might well be questioned.” Thankfully, the 10-fold increase in sensitivity was185
possible due to a clever arrangement of mirrors. The resulting high sensitivity made for a186
more convincing null result.187
A parametric manipulation. When we discuss null results in psychology, we often188
refer to a single effect that is not statistically significant. Michelson and Morley, however,189
were looking for a data pattern, rather than a single effect. The sine wave pattern expected190
due to the rotation of the table — a parameteric manipulation of the size of the expected191
“effect” — did not present itself. The test of the theory was therefore much stronger than it192
would have been if only one rotational angle had been considered.193
A theoretical expectation. The speed of the earth moving around the sun provided194
a value against which the null result could be compared. Michelson and Morley admit that it195
is possible that other motion might come into play besides the Earth moving around the sun196
— for instance, the sun moving through the galaxy — but to get such a null result, these197
motions would all have to add up just right to cancel out. This would be quite the198
coincidence, and so Michelson and Morley conclude that “chances are much against it.” They199
note, however, that repeating the experiment at longer time intervals would allow testing200
this possibility.201
Competing paradigms. As previously mentioned, in the nineteenth century the202
wave theory of light was dominant, but was not the only theory. The competing emission203
theory had no need for aether. Emission theory continued to be modified to account for new204
evidence into the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (e.g. Ritz, 1908).205
describing various difficulties encountered in using his first experimental apparatus. Interestingly, although
the first paper is based on results from a considerably less precise instrument, Michelson’s earlier conclusions
are more definitive: “The interpretation of these results is that there is no displacement of the interference
bands. The result of the hypothesis of a stationary ether is thus shown to be incorrect, and the necessary
conclusion follows that the hypothesis is erroneous.”
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Additionally, neither of the two major twentieth century theories in physics required206
the luminiferous aether. Einstein’s special theory of relativity (Einstein, 1905) made the207
aether redundant, and quantum electrodynamics (Feynman, 1985) accounted for all the wave208
properties of light without needing a propagation medium.209
These four factors — the highly-sensitive experiment, the parametric manipulation of210
the expected effect, a result far below a theoretical expectation, and a competing theory able211
to account for the effect — combine to create the most important null result in the history of212
science. In making the luminiferous aether unnecessary, Michelson and Morley’s results213
allowed physics move forward without it.214
Nuller than null: the case of Mendel and Fisher215
Gregor Mendel, a monk of seemingly impeccable character, conducted his famous216
experiments on peas over the years from 1856 to 1863. The painstaking task of breeding217
thousands of plants and carefully classifying their offspring paid off when the resulting data218
provided evidence that genetic traits were passed on in discrete forms. Mendel’s evidence was219
close agreement of the data from his pea plants with his theory’s predictions (Mendel, 1866).220
Although Mendel’s work on inheritance filled a key gap in nineteenth century biological221
understanding, it went largely unnoticed until the turn of the twentieth century when his222
results were rediscovered by several biologists (Piegorsch, 1990). The rediscovery sent ripples223
through the genetics community due to its theoretical importance. A small number of224
readers, however, noticed something else. Statistically speaking, the results were good;225
surprisingly good, in fact.226
Should a good fit to a true theory be surprising? As Pilgrim (1984) puts it, “Mendel’s227
results agreed with his theory. Why shouldn’t they, since his theory was correct?” Fisher228
(1936) took a different view. He believed the results were too good, and that this was229
evidence of data falsification. Even worse, Fisher suggests that this possibly “contravene[s]230
the weight of the evidence supplied in detail by his paper as a whole” (p. 132). This is not to231
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say Mendel was wrong, but that his results — which we review subsequently — were not as232
evidentiary as they might initially appear.233
Mendel’s experiments considered seven traits of the garden pea plant. Pea plants, like234
all living things, have visible traits called phenotypes that are defined by genes. For instance,235
a pea plant’s seeds might be round or wrinkled, depending on its genes. These genes come in236
pairs — one from each parent — and can be of different forms, called alleles.237
A dominant allele can override a recessive allele such that an organism with both types238
of allele will have the dominant trait. The round seed shape is dominant over the wrinkled239
shape. This means a seed with one of each allele, called heterozygous, will be round. The240
three possible genotypes and their corresponding phenotypes are shown in Figure 3.241
Mendel theorised there was a 50% chance of a parent passing each of its two alleles to242
its offspring. This leads to easily predictable genotypic ratios for the seed shape of offspring243
from two heterozygous parents (shown in Figure 4).244
The key to Mendel’s experiments were the ratio of phenotypes from crossings of245
different plants. Mendel could infer that a plant was heterozygous if, as a seed, it was round,246
yet some of its seeds were wrinkled. Wrinkled-seed offspring are a giveaway that the parent247
plant must be passing on a recessive allele, and hence it must be heterozygous. As Figure 4248
shows, if one crosses a heterozygous plant with itself, Mendel’s theory predicts that 75% of249
the seeds should be round.250
Table 1 shows the Mendel’s results from crossing heterozygous plants. Of 7324 seeds,251
we would expect 5493 to be round. Mendel reports that 5474 were round, only 19 round252
seeds from the number expected. Of course, the results of such experiments are variable: if253
Mendel is right, the standard deviation of the number of round seeds of 7324 is254
√
7324× .75× .25 ≈ 37. Mendel’s results are only half a standard deviation from the255
theoretical value. By itself, this closeness is not enough to raise suspicion: there would be a256
fair chance — 38% — of obtaining a closer result under Mendel’s theory.257
In 1936, Fisher considered all of Mendel’s experiments. For every experiment, we can258
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Table 1
Seed totals, N , and counts of seeds with the dominant phenotype, y, for the seed shape and seed
colour experiments taken from Mendel (1886); p is the theoretical proportion of seeds with the
dominant phenotype predicted by Mendel’s theory; z is the number of theoretical standard
deviations between the expected count and observed count.
p N y Np y −Np SD(y −Np) z = (y −Np)/SD(y −Np)
Shape 0.75 7,324 5,474 5,493.00 -19.00 37.06 -0.51
Colour 0.75 8,023 6,022 6,017.25 4.75 38.79 0.12
compute a deviation from the theoretical value, in standard errors. Because we are interested259
in the overall distance from the theoretical value, we square every deviation and sum them260
across all experiments. The result can be thought of as a squared distance, in standard261
errors, from the theoretical value. For round/wrinkled experiment considered above, we262
results were z1 = .51 standard errors below the theoretical value. In a second experiment,263
Mendel found that 6022 of 8023 seeds contained yellow, rather than green, seed leaves. The264
expected proportion was 75%, or about 6017 yellow leaves. This observation is five above265
what was expected, a mere z2 = .12 standard errors from the theoretical value.266
We might think of the theoretical value like the bull’s eye of a target, as shown in267
Figure 5A. The natural metric of the target is given by the expected variability of the268
estimate of the proportion, the standard error. The figure shows the standard errors as269
circles around the bull’s eye. To assess how close our two experiments are to the bull’s eye,270
we work out the distance from the center to the point (.51, .12), the number of standard271
errors our two experiments are away from the theoretical. In the case of our two experiments,272
this can be found by the familiar Pythagorean theorem:
√
.28.273
The distance by itself does not tell us whether the results are surprisingly close; to do274
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this, Fisher compared the observed values to the sampling distribution under Mendel’s275
theory. If Mendel was right, the squared distance for two points has a χ2 distribution with276
two degrees of freedom, as shown in Figure 5B. For each dimension (here, seed shape and277
color) we expect to be somewhat off center. The more dimensions the greater the expected278
distance, because each dimension contributes to the distance from the center. The expected279
squared distance for two experiments is 2 (these are the degrees of freedom of the χ2). The280
observed squared distance is much smaller: .28. Our observed distance from the bull’s eye is281
closer than what we would expect 87% of the time, if Mendel’s theory is correct. While far282
from definitive, this seems close enough to cause some suspicion. But this analysis only283
includes two of the 84 experiments reported by Mendel.284
Fisher tabulated the results of all 84 Mendel’s experiments. For clarity of presentation,285
in Figure 6 we have grouped the related results into the 16 series suggested by Edwards286
(1986) (Table 2, pp. 306-308), ranging from 2 to 20 degrees of freedom.3 Notice how most of287
the squared distances from the theoretical predictions seem to be on the low side, closer to 0288
than what we would expect. Across all 84 of Mendel’s experiments, we would expect on289
average a squared distance of 84. The observed squared distance is substantially less: 49.15.290
To understand how small this value is, Figure 7 shows a χ2 distribution with 84 degrees of291
freedom, the sampling distribution of the squared distance across all experiments assuming292
Mendel’s theory. The observed distance is so small that we would expect 99.9% of such sets293
of experiments to yield a larger distance. The experiments are very close to the theoretical294
values.295
So what? Is Weldon (1902) right when he says that Mendel’s results “admirably in296
accord with his experiment” (p. 235)? Is Pilgrim (1984) right to wonder what the fuss is all297
3The two experiments we considered are series 1 in Figure 6. The results are not exactly the same as
shown in Figure 5B due to the fact that Edwards (1986) has removed data that were used in another series
in order to make the data in each experiment independent from the others. This also causes the overall test
of all 84 experiments to be different from that computed by Fisher, but the difference does not affect the
conclusions. See Edwards (1986) pp. 299-300.
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about that results closely agree with a theory? Or is Fisher right when he suggests that298
“most, if not all, of the experiments have been falsified so as to agree closely with Mendel’s299
expectations” (1936, p. 132)? Do results that agree too closely with a theoretical null actually300
undermine the evidence?301
The last prominant statistician to weigh in on the debate was Edwards (1986), who302
said that303
“If it were just a question of having hit the bull’s eye with a single shot we might304
conclude [. . . ] that Mendel was simply lucky, but when a whole succession of305
shots comes close to the bull’s eye we are entitled to invoke skill or some other306
factor.” (Edwards, 1986, p. 303)307
Of course “skill” cannot overcome the problem of inherent random variability. Both308
Edwards4 and more recently Franklin (2008) suggest that Fisher’s analysis has stood the test309
of time: Mendel’s results are too good to be true. Yet the controversy is largely unknown310
outside of statistical circles. Why?311
Justified suspicion that a result is tainted does not mean it is wrong. We312
are in the lucky position a century and a half later of knowing that Mendel was right. Science313
is not always neat; biases will creep into even the most rigorous research, if only because it is314
scientific progress requires interpreting the results of experiments post hoc with incomplete315
information. As (Dobzhansky, 1967) wrote at the centennial of Mendel’s publication,316
“Few experimenters are lucky enough to have no mistakes or accidents happen in317
any of their experiments, and it is only common sense to have such failures318
4Interesting and relevant to the modern debate over significance testing is the fact that even the likelihoodist
Edwards was persuaded by Fisher’s logic, in spite of his skepticism of significance tests. He said that “[i]t
may be helpful if I admit at this point that for many years I supposed that Fisher’s analysis was going to be
able to be faulted because of its total reliance on the ‘repeated sampling’ logic of the X2 goodness-of-fit test
which I had come to mistrust, but a complete review of the whole problem has now persuaded me that his
‘abominable discovery’ must stand.” (1986, p. 310)
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discarded. The evident danger is ascribing to mistakes and expunging from the319
record perfectly authentic experimental results which do not fit one’s320
expectations.” (Dobzhansky, 1967, p. 1588)321
Luckily Mendel described his experiments in sufficient detail that they can be easily322
repeated. Doubt about any claim can be put to rest by rigorous replication of the procedure,323
provided that the theory is defined clearly enough to decide what a “replication” would be.324
Providing this clarity is one of the roles of a scientific paradigm.325
Interpretation of results occurs in the context of scientific theory. This326
seems especially obvious in the case of Mendel, given that the null was derived from327
Mendel’s theory. But suppose Mendel were a fair-minded experimentalist, and we could328
travel back in time and confront him with Fisher’s findings? Should Mendel abandon his329
theory? Probably not. Although Fisher’s critique threatens the evidential force of Mendel’s330
experiments, Fisher (1936) himself points out that Mendel, or anyone else in the nineteenth331
century, could have derived genetic theory from three simple postulates (1936, pp. 123-124);332
he also believed that Mendel may have done so. Fisher thought it possible that Mendel’s333
experiments were a “carefully planned demonstration of his conclusions” (Fisher, 1936, p.334
124), rather than their sole support. Mendel’s theory was strong enough to withstand335
Fisher’s critique of the evidence, in contrast to more recent psychological results subjected to336
similar scrutiny (see e.g. Simmons & Simonsohn, 2017).337
Unbelievable nulls: LIGO and gravity waves338
Michelson’s experiments using interferometers were not only important for their results;339
the Michelson interferometer is a tool that continues to be used in research. Michelson’s340
interferometers were about 1 meter wide. Modern interferometers range from palm-sized and341
small enough to fit in a satelite (Shepherd et al., 1993) to the immense Laser Interferometer342
Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO). The LIGO project operates two interferometers,343
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each with arms 4 km long.5344
The purpose of LIGO is not to find evidence for the luminiferous aether; rather, the345
LIGO team is hunting for gravitational waves. In Einstein’s general theory of relativity,346
gravity is the result of changes in the geometry of space-time: a mass, such as a star, bends347
space-time around it. When masses accelerate in certain ways — for example, black holes348
orbiting one another — these distortions are supposed to cause gravitational waves that349
propagate away from the source.350
The search for gravitational waves serves two purposes: as a test of general relativity,351
and as new way of conducting astronomy. We can use gravity waves in much the same way352
as we use x-ray, visible-light, microwave, and radio astronomy to piece together a picture of353
the history of the universe. Unlike light, however, gravitational waves are difficult to detect,354
because they involve extraordinarily subtle effects as they pass.355
This is where Michelson’s interferometer plays a key role. Laser light is split, shot356
down the 4 km length of the two arms, bounced back from precisely suspended mirrors. The357
laser light is recombined and passed to a detector. If the arms are the same length, the two358
recombined waves cancel; no laser light is detected. When a gravitational wave passes an359
interferometer, the two perpendicular arms will change lengths (Figure 8). If one arm is360
longer than the other, then the cancelation is imperfect and some of the light makes it to the361
detector. Space-time distortion from a passing gravitational wave shows up as fluctuations in362
the amount of laser light at the detector.363
Because fluctuations can happen for reasons other than gravitational waves, LIGO uses364
multiple sites to crosscheck its results: one in Washington and one in Louisiana. LIGO also365
cooperates with the smaller, 3 km Virgo interferometer in Italy (Figure 9). The LIGO team366
looks for “unusual” events that occur across the detectors. Looking for correlations across367
5Even LIGO will soon be eclipsed: the European Space Agency plans three satelites that will form an
gravitational-wave-detecting interferometer with arms 2.5 billion meters long, called the Laser Interferometer
Space Antenna (LISA). Imagine Michelson’s astonishment if he learned that the fiddly instrument with which
he struggled in a Potsdam cellar would one day be built on an interplanetary scale.
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these sites allows noisy fluctuations in only one detector to be discounted.368
LIGO’s first attempt at detecting gravitational waves in 2002 yielded a null result: that369
is, it was deemed consistent with background noise (LIGO Scientific Collaboration, 2004).370
Interestingly, this was expected; the first run was before the detectors were at full sensitivity.371
The introduction to the paper is worth quoting directly:372
“The first detection of gravitational wave bursts requires stable, well understood373
detectors, well-tested and robust data processing procedures, and clearly defined374
criteria for establishing confidence that no signal is of terrestrial origin. None of375
these elements were firmly in place as we began this first LIGO science run;376
rather, this run provided the opportunity for us to understand our detectors377
better, exercise and hone our data processing procedures, and build confidence in378
our ability to establish the detection of gravitational wave bursts in future379
science runs. Therefore, the goal for this analysis is to produce an upper limit on380
the rate for gravitational wave bursts, even if a purely statistical procedure381
suggests the presence of a signal above background.” (LIGO Scientific382
Collaboration, 2004, pp. 102001–3)383
Unlike Michelson’s conclusion from his 1881 experiment, the LIGO team was unwilling384
to accept the null on the basis of a noisy experiment; like Michelson and Morley’s 1887385
experiment, the LIGO state their results in terms of placing an upper limit on a quantity of386
interest.6387
From the first failure followed more. Six additional runs over more than a decade388
would yield no evidence — at least none the team was willing to accept as inconsistent with389
background noise — of graviational waves. LIGO became “advanced LIGO” as the team390
improved the sensitivity of their instruments. With each failure using a more sensitive391
6It is difficult to imagine a prominent psychology journal publishing a null result from an experiment
whose purpose is to advance understanding of a methodology. Such a result would almost certainly be rejected
as unimportant.
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device, a new upper limit was established. The titles tell the story: “Upper limits on392
gravitational-wave bursts in LIGO’s second science run” (The LIGO Scientific Collaboration,393
2005); “Upper limits on gravitational wave emission from 78 radio pulsars” (LIGO Scientific394
Collaboration, 2007); “Improved Upper Limits on the Stochastic Gravitational-Wave395
Background from 2009-2010 LIGO and Virgo Data” (LIGO and Virgo Collaboration, 2014).396
This work spawned about 100 papers from 2004 to 2016, characterizing the instruments,397
algorithms and their improvements, or presenting data from their science runs.398
Finally, in 2016 the team published a paper announcing the detection of gravitational399
waves from the merger of two black holes (LIGO Scientific Collaboration and Virgo400
Collaboration, 2016). We are more interested in what happened in the years before the401
detection. Why were the LIGO team unwilling to accept the null and hence the possibility402
that there were no gravitational waves? What was the difference between Michelson and403
Morley’s situation in the late 19th century and the LIGO team’s situation in the early 21st?404
We believe there are several.405
The prospect of more sensitive experiments. The LIGO team was constantly406
improving their instruments, and knew that more sensitive tests were just around the corner.407
Strong theoretical expectations and low sensitivity The LIGO team knew408
early on that their instruments were not sensitive enough to detect many gravitational wave409
events of interest, should they exist. Unlike Michelson and Morley, LIGO’s null results were410
not unexpected from the theory.411
No theoretical rival. Einstein’s general theory of relativity has withstood numerous412
tests over the past century. There is no rival to the theory that could take its place should413
gravitational waves not exist. Plunging a field into crisis is not something to be taken lightly,414
particularly at the expense of such a well-established theory.415
These three conditions made the acceptance of the null hypothesis difficult, even on the416
basis of multiple “failed” LIGO runs. Luckily, the persistence paid off. Since the 2016417
detection, the team has made several new detections. The ability to consistently detect and418
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characterize gravitational waves has the potential to usher in a new era of gravitational wave419
astronomy, which would not have happened if the team had accepted the null and given up.420
Conclusion421
In these three examples, a type of statistical null was rejected or accepted in relation to422
pragmatic considerations of what would facilitate the accumulation of scientific knowledge.423
Michelson and Morley’s result, for instance, appeared more compelling because an424
alternative to wave theory could account for the result. On the other hand, there is no425
alternative to general relativity, so the lack of gravitational waves would throw physics into426
crisis. Fisher noted that Mendel could have derived his predictions from three simpler427
theoretical postulates, rather than from the data themselves. In all three cases, the428
evidential value of the data was considered along with higher-level theoretical concerns429
within a theoretical paradigm. The experiments were not meant to show an isolated effect;430
rather, they were tests or demonstrations of aspects of a broad theory.431
In contrast, paradigmatic research programs — with concordant null hypotheses —432
have become scarce in the contemporary field of psychology. The paradigmatic progress433
exemplified by these three examples would not be possible within psychology’s current434
research landscape, which closely aligns with the Kuhnian description of a Pre-paradigm435
Science. This was not always true; in the mid twentieth century, psychological theorising had436
coalesced into several broad paradigmatic perspectives (e.g., Cognitive Dissonance Theory,437
Festinger, 1957). However, the subsequent decades saw psychology transform back into a438
discipline more clearly characterized by a pre-paradigm population of micro-theories. Often,439
these micro-theories consist solely of the described effect, followed by the word “theory” or440
“model”, resulting in empty restatements. Insofar as they can be construed as unfalsifiable,441
one might call them pseudo-theories (Fiedler, 2004). To the extent that these descriptive442
theories are arrived at entirely post-hoc, they can constitute entire pseudoscience disciplines443
(Lakatos, 1970).444
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Consider the facial feedback hypothesis (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988), in which445
feedback from the face is assumed to modulate emotion. Wagenmakers et al. (2016) recently446
attempted to replicate the 1988 study, obtaining a null result across several labs and447
thousands of participants. In Normal Science, this might lead to a paradigmatic crisis or new448
boundary conditions, either of which could be construed as progress. Instead, Wagenmakers449
et al. (2016) simply claim a failure to replicate, leaving Strack (2016) to offer a series of post450
hoc reasons why it might not have replicated. It is not clear what was learned from the451
episode, because the facial feedback hypothesis is not strongly linked to a broader paradigm452
positing boundary conditions and mechanisms; it is a label for an effect. When an effect453
stands on its own, rather than in relation to a paradigm, the implications a null result has454
for the progress of psychological science are unclear.7455
On the surface, psychology espouses the same standards of hypothesis testing as most456
mature sciences: a Popperian (1959) emphasis on falsificationism predicated hypotheses457
derived from explanatory paradigms. These typically constitute clear predictions that458
distinguish the underlying explanatory accounts of distinct paradigms, allowing for the459
specification and testing of theoretical boundary conditions which illuminate the cases in460
which a particular paradigm may be more or less explanatory compared to its rivals461
(McGuire, 2013). Within the context of psychology, theoretical boundary conditions462
necessarily take on a different character, given that “theories” are often little more than463
descriptions of phenomena, with “boundaries” that cannot extend beyond descriptions of464
individual effects.465
When falsification can no longer be tethered to the boundary conditions of explanatory466
paradigms, Popperian null hypothesis testing shifts to the reliability of individual effects; if467
an effect does not replicate as predicted, it has been “falsified” (Ferguson & Heene, 2012).468
7This is not to say that null results are not important outside of Normal Science; it is just to say that their
interpretation depends on having a paradigmatic background against which to understand them. Science is
more than a catalog observations, but such a catalog may be a crucial ingredient to a developing scientific
paradigm.
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Accordingly, the historical emphasis on theory-framed hypothesis testing has been replaced469
by the statistical significance of hypothesized effects (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2018; Open470
Science Collaboration, 2012, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) where these471
predictions are increasingly tested against a pre-registered hypothesis for predicted outcomes.472
In a Normal Science setting, experimental hypotheses follow from predictions that473
themselves follow from well-developed theories, obviating the need for the pre-registration of474
the hypothesis. Moreover, replacing paradigmatic falsifiability with replicability of effects475
discourages researchers from attending to the paradigmatic principles that allow for476
contextualized assessments of the evidential value of a given of replication “failure” (Stroebe477
& Strack, 2014). This further entrenches, rather than opposes, the pre-paradigm nature of478
much of psychological science (also see Fiedler, Kutzner, & Krueger, 2012).479
Acting within Normal Science, all three groups of experimenters we have highlighted —480
Michelson and Morley, Mendel, and the LIGO team — are celebrated for their careful481
experimentation. Michelson invented multiple iterations of his device to reduce the noise in482
his measurements. Mendel grew thousands of pea plants across 84 experiments to483
demonstrate his theory. The LIGO team invested a decade honing their experimental skills484
before finding a single gravitational wave. This attention to detail is possible when scientific485
progress is not defined by arguments over individual effects and statistical significance, but is486
rather guided by work within, or opposing, a broad paradigm. If psychology reasserts itself487
as a Normal Science, only then will it become a field unified by wide-ranging theoretical488
perspectives in which evidence for statistical regularities are valued at least as much as489
significant differences.490
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A B
Figure 1 . Michelson and Morley’s device (1887, fig. 3 and 4 from the manuscript). A:
Perspective drawing of the device without its wooden cover. The surface was about 1.5m
square. B: Schematic of the table surface. Light emitted from the light source a through a
lens hits a beam splitter b and is sent along one of two perpendicular paths. The light is
then reflected back and forth by mirrors at d and di (and opposite), until they are reflected
back by mirror e or ei. They pass back though the beam splitter and part of both beams is
sent to an eyepiece at f . The mirror ei is finely adjustable so that the two beams can be
equated in length. An extra beam splitter c is used to ensure that both beams move through
the same amount of glass.
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Figure 2 . The data from Michelson and Morley’s experiment, as presented in the manuscript.
The top series shows the average of the detrended noon runs, and the bottom the detrended
evening runs. The y axis is the amount of shift in fringes. The dotted curve shows the
expected pattern at 1/8 the expected amplitude of 0.4. In the schematic above, the point
marked “a” represents the light source on the sketch of the instrument.
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Figure 3 . All possible genotypes and corresponding phenotypes for the seed shape trait. Seed
shape has two possible alleles (round and wrinkled) and the round allele is dominant. Icons
for the genotypes (black-and-white) and phenotypes (solid black) are shown here and used in
subsequent figures. The circle denotes the round allele and the star, the wrinkled allele.
Figure 4 . An example of Mendelian genetics with two heterozygous parents (left and top of
each square). Inside the squares are the four crossings of the two alleles from each parent. A:
The genotype of each possible cross. B: The phenotype of each possible cross. Although 50%
of the alleles correspond to the wrinkled phenotype, only 25% of the resulting plants will be
wrinkled due to the wrinkled allele’s recessiveness.
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Figure 5 . A: Calculating the distance, in standard errors, of a pair of estimates (red circle)
from the theoretical values (center of the bull’s eye). Diamonds on the axes show the
individual observations in each experiment. B: The distribution of the squared distance,
assuming two points. The expected squared distance is 2, as shown by the triangle on the
bottom axis. The probabilty of getting a smaller squared distance than the one observed
is about .13, assuming Mendel’s theory. The shaded region shows the middle 50% of the
distribution.
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Figure 6 . Results from Edwards’ (1986) sixteen groupings of Mendel’s 84 experiments, along
with theoretical distributions. The series are sorted by deviation from expectation, and scaled
by expectation (degrees of freedom) in order to visually align all the results. Shaded regions
show the middle 50% of the distributions.
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Figure 7 . Theoretical distribution across all 84 experiments. The red line indicates the
observed total squared distance 49.15 (calculated from Edwards’ 1986 data). There is a
99.9% chance that a random value from this distribution would be larger than 49.15. The
shaded region shows the middle 50% of the distribution and its expectation is indicated by
the triangle on the bottom axis.
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Figure 8 . How gravitational waves distort the length of the two perpendicular arms of the
LIGO Michelson interferometers.
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Figure 9 . Locations of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO)
sites in the United States, and the Virgo interferometer in Italy.
